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STEVEN L. YAFFEE*

Lessons About Leadership from the
History of the Spotted Owl

Controversy
ABSTRACT
The evolution of the spotted owl controversy provides numerous
examples of problematic administrativeand politicaldecisionmaking.
Agency leaders first tried to avoid dealing with the issue, then placed
it into standardoperatingprocedures that were inadequateto handle
it. In the process, they became isolated from political values and
organizationalrealities,lost credibility, demoralized agency employees, and ceded their role as agents of organizational and policy
change. Leaders need to create organizations that constantly seek
new ideas, reward creativity and risk-taking, scan for changes in
values and preferences in the external environment, and continually
build a data base of information that informs necessary choices. Since
political power is highly fragmented today, leaders also must work
to build political concurrence through coalition-formation,outreach,
and the use of alternative dispute resolution approaches.
A remarkable set of opportunities exists today for reinventing
natural resource management policies and institutions so that they can
better deal with the challenges of the next century. The opportunities in
part come from the development of new ideas and approaches in
conservation science, social science, and organizational management.
They are facilitated by changes in leadership, as a new generation rises
to positions in the White House and the agencies, and reductions-in-force
open up career pathways for younger agency employees. In addition, the
opportunities of the times are partly a reflection of the failures of past
management approaches, as the effects of past management become
evident in degraded natural systems, serious waste management
problems on federal lands, and a continuing set of festering endangered
The terms "reinventing government"2 and
species controversies.'

* Professor of Natural Resource Policy at the University of Michigan School of Natural
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1. Steven L. Yaffee, THE WISDOM OF THE SPOTTED OWL: POLICY LESSONS FOR A NEW
CENTURY 300-04 (1994).
2. DAVID E. OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVEwInNG GOVERNMENT; How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRrI IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBUC SECTOR (1992).
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"ecosystem management" may rapidly be elevated to buzzword status,
but the interest underlying them in seeking new ways to manage public
agencies and resources is unmistakable and will have long-lasting effects.
Almost no one would deny that the past decade has been a time
of tremendous upheaval and change for the United States Forest Service
(USFS). USFS leaders increasingly were unable to meet the demands
brought by a diverse set of publics, partly because of the magnitude of
these demands and the ability of interest groups to press their interests
in a variety of public arenas, and partly because the national forest
system was running out of slack with which to satisfy conflicting
demands. Change in what the public valued in forest resources was also
evident as an increasingly urbanized population sought more noncommodity resources from national forest lands, even as their patterns of
commodity consumption increased. Legislation that responded to
emergent environmental concerns in the 1970s, such as the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),4 the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), came home to roost
in the 1980s, demanding new behaviors from administrative agencies
monitored by interest groups who now had standing in court to question
agency choices.
Other changes were also in the air. The scientific base underlying
land management developed considerably in the 1980s, with the advent
of conservation biology and landscape ecology. The values and attitudes
of different groups within the USFS reflected these changes outside the
agency, and produced a robust set of disagreements within the agency
about the direction and methods of forest management. The changing
demographics of the agency, and a court-influenced mandate to create a
more diverse workforce, contributed significantly to a sense of orderly
turmoil within the agency.
These changes within and outside the USFS yielded visible,
protracted conflicts over the direction of forest policy and the management agenda for specific forest units. The planning process mandated by
NFMA and embraced wholeheartedly by the agency as a credible way
out of conflict, served to promote conflict as nongovernmental groups
challenged agency choices. Similar battles over wilderness, roading, and
the management of forests like the Tongass National Forest in southeastern Alaska were visible evidence of policy and value changes in process.
Retiring regional foresters and forest supervisors criticized agency

3. R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 J.SOC'Y FOR CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 27 (1994).

4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1973).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (1976).
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direction in ways that would have been seen as disloyal in an earlier
era,7 and personnel matters, such as the reassignment of a regional
forester for allegedly not meeting timber targets, issues that would never
have seen the light of public inquiry in an earlier day, were front page
news.8 An agency that valued control and a public image as a professional, science-based organization that simultaneously served public
needs while protecting national lands increasingly was cast in the media
as out of control and inappropriately serving both the public and
resource protection objectives.
Perhaps no issue symbolized the character of forest management
decision-making in a time of turbulence as the battle over the management of the forests in the Pacific Northwest, and its implications for the
long term survival of the northern spotted owl. An issue that had its
origins in the 1970s, the spotted owl dispute evolved through administrative decision-making, administrative appeals, court challenges, and
legislative politics. By 1989, environmental groups effectively had stopped
the federal timber sales programs of the USFS and the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) in the Pacific Northwest, and timber interests were
forecasting dramatic economic and job impacts. The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) declared the owl a federally-recognized endangered species, and indicated that more than 11 million acres of land
might be important habitat for the owl.9
The dispute moved through several interagency efforts to find a
compromise solution, bills began to wind through Congress to declare
portions of Region 6 national forests as ancient forest reserves, and the
executive office began to pressure the agencies to find an impact-minimizing way out of the conflict. The BLM applied for an exemption from the
Endangered Species Act for a set of proposed timber sales, initiating a
process of consideration by the so-called God Squad 0 that could, for the
7. Timothy Egan, Forest Service Abusing Role, Dissidents Say, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1990, at
27.
8. Scott Sonner, "Tip of Iceberg" in Park Scandal: Two Officials Cite White House Pressure to
Disregard Laws, DENVER POST, Sept. 25, 1991, at IA.
9. 56 Fed. Reg. 20,821 (1991).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988). The 1978 amendments to the Endangered Species Act
provided development interests recourse when faced with a conflict that they viewed as
irreconcilable. The Endangered Species Committee can be called into session to evaluate and
review the nature of the dispute and determine whether the national interest requires
overriding the absolute mandate of the Act. While it was included as a political pressure
valve in response to criticism that the Act was unacceptably inflexible, the provision was
carefully crafted to require as much activity as possible prior to having the committee make
a decision. Before the committee can grant an exemption, the Secretary of the Interior must
certify that there are no viable alternatives to the proposed action, it is in the national or
regional public interest, the development agency has not acted irreversibly while consultation was ongoing, and the consultation was conducted in good faith. Five of seven commit-

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

first time, yield a conscious decision to exempt a project from the
requirements of the ESA.
Some would argue that the owl dispute was an historical
inevitability, as changing public values-and interest groups organized
to pursue those values-ran head on into the traditional directions of the
USFS in the Pacific Northwest. Under any circumstances, the owl conflict
would have been an extremely difficult issue to deal with, containing
within it significant scientific and economic uncertainties, underlying and
unresolved policy questions, and extremely high stakes for all interests
in how it was resolved. As it involved fundamental social choices, the
issue is also representative of broad problems in how we collectively
make such choices through legislative and administrative arenas. But a
review of the history of the owl dispute suggests that it partly reflects
failures of leadership, both inside and outside the USFS.
While organizations are always changing, particularly turbulent
times demand more from agency leaders, and allow for new patterns of
leadership to emerge. In the spotted owl case, agency leaders failed to
anticipate, observe, and respond to changing circumstances. They
effectively turned over their role as agents of managed organizational and
policy change to other voices, both inside and outside the agency. Part of
their response to the issue was rational and well-motivated in terms of
short-term organizational impacts and political priorities. Leaders acted
to uphold their sense of organizational mission, follow their view of
political needs and realities, and protect agency workforce and budget.
Regardless, their response to the changes underlying the issue was
inadequate in either resolving the controversy or building an agency less
likely to find itself in similar situations in the future.

tee members have to vote in support of an exemption before one can be granted, and only
after they certify that no alternatives exist, the benefits outweigh the risks to the species, and
the action is in the public interest and is of regional or national significance. 50 C.F.R.

450-53 (1993).
Prior to the spotted owl controversy, the exemption process had been convened
twice: First, to consider the Tellico dam-snail darter conflict; and subsequently to consider
the conflict between the Grayrocks dam and reservoir in Wyoming and the downstream
habitat needs of the whooping crane in Nebraska. In neither case was an exemption granted
that would result in the extinction of a species. In the Tellico case, committee members
determined that the project benefits were far less than supporters claimed and they turned
down the request for an exemption. In the Grayrocks case, the uncertainty surrounding the
outcome of the committee's decision encouraged the parties to the dispute to reach a
settlement that guaranteed certain water levels and funding to the whooping crane. See also
STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PRoHMrrMV PoucY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT (1982); Julia M. Wondolleck, Bargaining for the Environment: Compensation and
Negotiation in the Energy Facility Siting Process (1979) (unpublished M.S. thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
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The remainder of this paper describes the evolution of the issue,
focusing primarily on administrative decisions of the 1970s and 1980s that
illustrate how the USFS leadership responded to it. The paper then
discusses a set of lessons for leadership that the case suggests. New
models of leadership are needed so that the USFS and its peer land
management agencies do not continue to relive the spotted owl nightmare.
The Evolution of the Spotted Owl Issue
The origins of the spotted owl controversy lie in research and
administrative action in the early 1970s. In a climate of developing
national interest in nongame wildlife species, Eric Forsman, a graduate
student at Oregon State University (OSU), and Howard Wight, OSU
faculty member and leader of the FWS-funded Oregon Cooperative
Wildlife Research Unit, began to study the biology and ecology of the
owl, and rapidly became concerned about USFS harvesting practices."
Forsman and Wight were convinced that their early research indicated
that the owl was in trouble, and they began to lobby for changes in
policy and on-the-ground management to protect the owl while additional research was carried out.
An opportunity for promoting management action appeared with
the creation in 1973 of the Oregon Endangered Species Task Force
(OESTF), an interagency group of scientists and managers with representatives from the USFS, BLM, FWS, OSU, and Oregon state government.
At its first meeting, the Task Force focused on the owl in part because it
seemed like an easy problem to handle. 2 As an interim measure, the
OESTE recommended that 300 acres of habitat be set aside at each owl
nest site or sighting, representing Eric Forsman's best guess as to the
minimum area of old growth that owls were using.'3 The group also
recommended that research focus on the needs of the owl, and that a
map of existing old growth on federal lands be compiled for planning
and management purposes.
While the pace of research activity increased in response to the
group's recommendations, little else occurred. USFS and BLM leaders
rejected the task force's interim recommendations, arguing among other

11. Interview with Eric D. Forsman, Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Pacific
Northwest Research Station, in Olympia, Washington (July 27, 1989); Memorandum from
Howard M. Wight, Oregon Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit, to Thomas S. Baskett, FWS
Division of Wildlife Research (July 31,1972) (regarding Timber Harvest--as it Affects Spotted Owl Habitat) (on file with author).
12. Oregon Endangered Species Task Force, Minutes (June 29,1973) (on file with author).
13. Forsman, supra note 11.
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things that the temporary set-asides were not needed, noting that "the
'management by individual animal location' philosophy, when applied
to all species which may be identified as requiring old-growth stand
habitat,4 presents a land management specter of considerable magnitude."0
The OESTF's request to the USFS and the BLM for a map of
remaining old-growth habitat met with an equally limited response.
While the agency representatives agreed at the task force's first meeting
to bring a map to their second meeting, they were unable to do so, partly
because the agencies lacked a comprehensive inventory of habitat
information.' 5 In response, the task force hired Glenn Juday, an OSU
doctoral student, to map old growth stands using infrared satellite
photographs, a project that he completed in six months at a cost of
$827.'" Based on his mapping work, Juday identified thirteen clusters
of old growth spotted owl areas that in his view needed some type of
immediate protection.
Over the next two years, Eric Forsman continued his research, but
not much else happened since the agencies remained uninterested in owls
or old growth. Late in 1976, however, the BLM was gearing up for a
major planning process and needed guidance, and the BLM biologists in
western Oregon began to push the OESTF for an owl management plan.
A draft plan was produced in October, 1977, recommending that land
managers protect 400 pairs of owls (290 on USFS land, 90 on BLM land,
and 20 on state and private land), clustered into forty 10-pair concentrations. Three hundred acres of contiguous old growth was to be set
aside for each protected pair, in what early drafts called
owl "enclaves"
8
and the final plan labeled "owl management areas.,"
The response of USFS and BLM leadership was slightly more
favorable to the task force's plan than to their earlier recommendations,
agreeing to follow the guidelines as interim direction, subject to decisions
made in ongoing planning processes. The USFS and BLM response
evidenced a pattern of behavior on the part of agency leaders that
remained consistent throughout the next decade: First, establishing
national or regional policies that appeared to set aside small areas of
habitat for owl protection, though actual implementation depended on
14. Quoted by Bill Nietro, Chronology of Events Related to the Spotted Owl Issue 2-3
(undated) (unpublished report, on file at BLM Oregon State Office).
15. Oregon Endangered Species Task Force, Minutes (Aug. 22,1973) (on file with author).
16. Oregon Endangered Species Task Force, Minutes (Mar. 12, 1974; Sept. 25, 1974) (on
file with author).
17. Oregon Endangered Species Task Force, Minutes (Oct. 17,1977) (on file with author).
18. Robert Maben, Oregon Dep't of Fisheries & Wildlife, Enclave Parameters (Oct. 13,
1977) (unpublished report, on file with author); Oregon Endangered Species Task Force,
Minutes, Appendix A, Management Area Parameters (Oct. 17, 1977) (on file with author).
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decisions at the forest level; second, making choices on an interim basis,
with the final decisions made in other agency planning processes; third,
doing enough to avoid losing control by having the owl listed under the
ESA; and fourth, maintaining an aggressive timber program that over
time precluded options for owl management.
The fact that the agencies agreed to follow the task force's
recommendations at all, in contrast to their response in 1973, reflects a
shift in national and regional politics, and changes in public lands law
that had occurred by the end of the 1970s. Environmental interest groups
were becoming potent adversaries of federal agencies, and environmental
laws like NEPA and the ESA had been tested and proven to be important
considerations for agency decisionmaking. New laws such as NFMA
prescribed behavior that was more fully cognizant of environmental
impacts and the diversity of interests in public resource management.
NFMA in particular promised a technically-credible, agency-controlled way out of festering disputes for the USFS, and the agency
embraced its planning process as a way to build understanding of and
support for its land management programs. It also contained an explicit
recognition of the need to protect plant and animal diversity. While
agency officials expected that issues like owl and old-growth management would be dealt with at the forest level in the planning process,
wide-ranging issues like owl management did not quite fit NFMA's
largely forest-level decisionmaking process, and environmental interest
groups were quite willing to remind the agency of this fact.
While the agencies' response to the owl plan did not impact
much land-it potentially reserved 87,000 acres for owl habitat, some of
which would be on already reserved lands, out of a national forest land
base in Washington and Oregon of 24 million acresl--their decisions
were also the first actionable decisions of the agencies on spotted owl
management. As long as no decisions had been made, the agencies could
not be challenged. But the USFS and BLM decisions to follow the
OESTF's owl plan was the first time interest groups had something to
shoot at, and both environmental and timber interests responded.
With advocacy tactics sharpened in a decade of wilderness
battles, environmental groups led by the Oregon Wilderness Coalition,
predecessor group to the Oregon Natural Resources Council, filed
administrative appeals of the agencies' decisions to follow the plan on the
grounds that no environmental impact analysis had been conducted as
required by NEPA.' The Regional Forester denied the groups' appeals,
19. YAFm, supra note 1, at 37.

20. Oregon Wilderness Coalition et al., Statement of Reasons Before the Chief, U.S. Forest
Service, In the Matter of Region VI Spotted Owl Habitat Guidelines (Feb. 11, 1980); National
Wildlife Federation et al., Statement of Reasons Before the Interior Board of Land Appeals,
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arguing that the owl plan represented minimum numbers of owl pairs to
be protected, and that additional owls would survive on other lands. In
addition, "The Forest Service proposes to review and adopt, if appropriate, the recommendations of the Task Force through the land management planning process. Both issues of old-growth and spotted owl
management will be considered in the Regional Plan [and the forest
plans, and impact statements would be prepared for these plans]."'
Upon appeal of the Regional Forester's decision, the Chief supported his
regional forester, though set out a different argument for why NEPA had
not been violated: "No NEPA violation has occurred because the plan is
an affirmative protective measure" to protect owls subject to the decisions
made in the NFMA planning process.'
While the environmental groups had lost the first skirmishes
leading to the owl war of the 1980s, and they decided not to pursue their
arguments in court at the time, the Chief had given them a tool for future
use. His decision promised that a "proper biological analysis," indicating
the number and distribution of owls that would constitute a viable
population, would be included in the Regional Plan, the agency
document that would guide planning at the forest level. 3
Those who were arguing for setting aside land for owls or other
non-timber purposes were also helped by the development of new
information about the owl, the evolution of conservation science, and an
expanding interpretation of what constitutes a minimum viable population. For example, research by Eric Forsman and others indicated that the
owl's habitat requirements might be much greater than previously
thought. Radiotelemetry work, completed in 1980, found that mean home
range sizes were 3,859 acres in the Oregon Cascades and 4,728 acres in
the Coast Range, and the minimum amount of old growth found within
the combined home ranges of an owl pair was 1,009 acres.24 The Oregon
Endangered Species Task Force had been reorganized into a bi-state
interagency group called the Oregon-Washington Interagency Wildlife
Committee, and the group revised the 1979 task force plan based on the

U.S. Dep't of Interior, In the Matter of BLM Oregon State Office Spotted Owl Habitat
Guidelines, IBLA 80-370 (Feb. 25, 1980).
21. Letter from James F. Torrence, Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, for Richard
E. Worthington, Regional Forester, to Terrence L. Thatcher, Pacific Northwest Resources
Clinic 3 (Mar. 20, 1980) (on file with author).
22. Decision of the Chief of the Forest Service on an Appeal of a Decision of the Regional
Forester, Region 6 Spotted Owl Habitat Guidelines 3 (Aug. 11, 1980).
23. Id. at 4.
24. Eric D. Forsman, Summary of Radiotelemetry Studies Conducted on Spotted Owls in
Western Oregon (Feb. 4, 1981) (unpublished report presented to the Oregon-Washington
Interagency Subcommittee, on file with author). See also ERIc D. FORsMAN ET AL., DISTRIbUTION AND BIOLOGY OF THE SPOTTED OWL IN OREGON (1984).
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new information. In a revised plan forwarded to the agencies in March,
1981, old-growth requirements were upped from 300 to 1000 acres per
owl pair.'
At the same time that new information was developing about the
habitat requirements of the owl, scientists in academe and government
were establishing new theories and methods of conservation biology. The
concept of biological diversity and what it meant for land management
changed considerably in the 1980s. Prior to this time, maximizing
diversity meant maximizing the number of species present in an area.
One way to do this was to create large amounts of "edge" in the
landscape, such as is created by a lot of patchy clearcuts. Hence, timber
harvesting and species diversity objectives walked hand in hand. The
problem with this, concept of diversity is that edge effects promote early
successional species at the expense of species associated with later
successional stages, including the spotted owl. In the 1980s, the scientific
understanding of diversity started to expand to incorporate this reality,
and ecosystems like the old growth system of the Pacific Northwest, once
thought to be biological deserts, were examined more closely as
repositories of important biological values. Methods for assessing the
status and future of species populations also began to change, incorporating concepts from genetics and risk assessment, and changing the nature
of management debates from pure "expert judgment" to judgments based
on the implications of population viability analysis that attempted to
establish a "minimum viable population."
Some of these new ideas were picked up in the USFS's draft
regional plan for the Pacific Northwest region, but the regional guidance
equally reflected the agency's confusion about the owl issue. A draft owl
management analysis was prepared in the. fall of 1980 and, grappling
with the notion of population viability, analyzed the effectiveness of three
alternative owl densities: A-subsistence, B-midrange, and C-saturation.
While the third alternative scored the highest on agency objectives and
public concerns, the planning team was concerned about its feasibility in
other realms: "While all [Interdisciplinary Team) members agreed that
management for spotted owls at this upper population density range
would best meet spotted owl management objectives considered, it
provided the least opportunity to manage for other resources, especially
timber. " 6

25. Oregon-Washington Interagency Wildlife Committee, Proposed Revision of the
Oregon Interagency Spotted Owl Management Plan (Feb. 26, 1981) (draft, on file with
author).

26. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Spotted Owl Management Proposal for Region VI
(1980) (unpublished review draft, on file with author).
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Since the Interdisciplinary Team (ID Team) viewed their first set
of conclusions as problematic, they sought a different approach that
might yield a more palatable answer, and asked an interagency group of
scientists what was the absolute minimum number of owl pairs that
would represent a viable population. The biologists reluctantly responded
that any population density below forty percent of the existing population would not represent a viable population.' Based on this advice, the
ID Team recommended that owls be managed on national forest lands at
56 percent of the Oregon population and 50 percent of the Washington
population. Since these numbers translated to 425 pairs of owls to be
protected on Oregon lands, a 47 percent increase in owl protection over
the level recommended in the OESTFs owl plan, and 270 pairs on
Washington national forest lands, they were not acceptable to regional
leadership, and the ID Team went back to work to find another way to
generate an acceptable owl plan.
Pressed by USFS researchers Jack Ward Thomas and Jerry Verner
to incorporate some of the new understanding of viability resulting from
the application of population genetics, the ID Team invited Dr. Michael
Soul6, a California geneticist, to consult with them. Based on experimental work with fruitflies and theoretical modeling, Souls earlier had
suggested a rule of thumb for minimizing the effects of genetic inbreeding as maintaining a breeding population of 500 individuals. In a
December, 1980, meeting, he suggested that if the northern subspecies of
spotted owls could be maintained at or above a population of 500
breeding pairs, genetic stability would not be a problem, though it would
not protect against other kinds of threats to the population.
While not intended to be definitive, the magic 500 number was
picked up in the next draft of the spotted owl portion of the Draft
Regional Plan, with the ID Team recommending that 510 owl pairs be
protected throughout the two-state planning area.2 Even at 510 owl
pairs, regional USFS leadership was still not satisfied with the ID Team's
analysis and proposed decision, and in the final Draft Regional Plan put
out for public comment in May, 1981, protection was dialed back one
more step. ° The Draft Plan walked a confusing line between the
27. Memorandum from Kirk M. Horn, Wildlife Biologist, Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, to the files (Nov. 18,1980) (regarding Region VI Spotted Owl Management-Viable Population Procedures).
28. Memorandum from Leon Murphy, Director of Fish & Wildlife, Forest Service, U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, Region VI, to Meeting Participants (Jan. 5, 1981) (regarding Spotted
Owl Coordination Meeting-Summary) (on file with author).
29. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Spotted Owl Management Proposal for Region VI 16
(Jan. 8, 1981) (unpublished report, on fie with author).
30. Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Pacific Northwest Regional Plan 4, App. III
(May 1981) (draft).
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different opinions about the number of owl pairs that constituted a
minimum viable population, and the amount of old growth acreage that
each pair required. It identified 375 pairs of owls as the minimum viable
population (263 in Oregon and 112 in Washington), but requested forest
plans to include analysis of the implications of greater amounts of
protection. In addition, the Draft Plan included as appendices both the
1979 OESTF's plan that recommended 300 acres of old growth per pair
and the 1981 update recommending 1,000 acres of old growth. The Plan
stated that current research indicated that owls needed 1,000 acres, but
interim management was set at protecting 300 acres.
While the Plan appeared to come down on both sides of the
issue, it also attempted to avoid problems by claiming that "the Regional
Plan will make no final decisions on spotted owls; these are made as
Forest Plans are completed and the impacts made more visible."31
Unfortunately, the attempted finesse of the underlying dilemma for the
agency did not work. The guidance established by the Plan was
extremely confusing to forest planners, and served as a lightning rod for
interest group concerns. For example, timber interests, claiming the costs
of the Plan to be roughly a million dollars per owl pair, made their
concerns known to the agency via the intervention of John Crowell,
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture in charge of the Forest Service, and
former Louisiana-Pacific executive in Oregon.'
If the Regional Plan was problematic from the perspective of
timber groups, further interpretations of the NFMA regulations were
even more so. In response to a forest supervisor who proposed placing
all owl habitat areas in existing wilderness areas, wildlife staff member
Dr. Hal Salwasser provided guidance that noted the importance of a
well-distributed population. According to Salwasser, in a memo that was
signed by the Associate Deputy Chief and subsequently incorporated in
changed regulations, not only did NFMA require a minimum number of
owls, but the owls had to be distributed over the historic range of the
species, an expansion of policy that could significantly extend the impact
of owl management.'
The final Regional Guide (formerly Plan) was published in May,
1984, and while it had taken three years to move from draft to final stage,

31. Memorandum from Jeff M. Sirmon, Regional Forester, Region VI, to Forest Supervisor,
Gifford Pinchot National Forest, Spotted Owl Habitat (Mar. 11, 1982) (on file with author).
32. Letter from John B. Crowell, Jr., Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, to R.
Max Peterson, Chief, Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture (July 14, 1981) (regarding
Spotted Owls) (on file with author).
33. Memorandum from J.B. Hilmon, Associate Deputy Chief, Forest Service, U.S. Dep't
of Agriculture, to Regional Foresters (Feb. 24,1982) (regarding Wildlife and Fish Viable Populations in Forest Planning) (on file with author).
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little changed in its guidance on wildlife habitat planning.' The Guide
clearly looked like it had not fully incorporated information generated in
the previous four years, and that it was walking a line between what was
seen as biologically legitimate and what was seen as politically and
economically correct. Forest plans, where real decisions would be.made
should they ever be finalized, would include a range of alternatives
grounded in minimum biological requirements, while day-to-day
management was unaffected. The level of owl protection at the forest
level remained fairly minimal and dependent on the benevolence of
individual forest managers.
No one was happy with the Regional Guide, and both timber and
environmental interests objected. Both sides argued that the analysis of
owl management strategies in the Guide was inadequate. Environmental
groups felt it underprotected owls, and that its data and methodology
were sadly out-of-date.' Timber groups felt it overprotected owls and
that the methodology was flawed.' Both groups felt that the USFS's
approach to developing the Guide was seriously in violation of NEPA
requirements. Timber, hoping that the guidance would fade into the
woodwork, argued that a more complete NEPA analysis would only
waste time. Environmental groups, on the other hand, sensed an
opportunity to gain leverage over the direction of harvest activities, and
pressed for a more elaborate, supplemental analysis of owl management.
The environmental groups made their argument in an appeal of
the Regional Guide in the fall of 1984,' 7 and while the Chief supported
his Regional Forester's decision, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Douglas MacCleery overruled the Chief.' MacCleery remanded
the decision back to the Chief and required the USFS to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) on spotted owl management. To some observers, MacCleery's decision reflected a belief on the
part of political leaders that what the Region had done was in violation
of NEPA and that the USFS could get in trouble in the courts. Others
argue that MacCleery, a former Washington lobbyist for the Forest
Products Trade Association, was responding to the concerns of timber

34. See FOREST SERvIcE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REGION VI REGIONAL GuIDE (1984).
35. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation et al., Joint Statement of Reasons and Petition
for Preparation of a Joint Agency Environmental Impact Statement (Oct. 18, 1984) (on file
with author).
36. See, e.g., Letter from Richard T. Bailey, Director of Planning and Special Projects,
Industrial Forestry Association, to John B. Crowell, Jr., Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture (Jan. 7, 1985) (on file with author).
37. National Wildlife Federation et al., supra note 35.
38. Douglas W. MacCleery, Decision Related to the Administrative Appeal of the Region
VI Regional Guide and EIS (Mar. 8,1985) (review of administrative decision by Chief, Forest
Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture).
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interests who felt that a further analysis of the owl situation would
conclude that the owls were not in danger. Still other observers suggest
that timber was willing to go along with anything that would delay final
action on forest plans, since the older timber management plans generally
allowed a higher level of timber outputs. Regardless, the remand tossed
the owl issue squarely back in the USFS's lap, requiring them to
undertake a comprehensive analysis on owl management that they knew
all parties would examine closely.
The SEIS analysis was the first time that USFS leaders took the
owl issue seriously, and they put a great deal of effort into it. The
analysis and evaluation began in the summer of 1985, and a draft impact
statement was put out for public review in August, 1986.' A final
record of decision was not filed until more than two years later.4 The
amount of time it took to complete the SEIS reflected how controversial
an issue the owl case was becoming. While much of the analysis was an
honest assessment of owl viability under different scenarios, assumptions
that were made along the way and wordsmithing that occurred at the
end of the process were problematic. The SEIS was the agency's best
hope for a technically-credible way out of the developing controversy at
a time when polarization between the affected groups was not extreme,
but it failed to provide one.
The SEIS analysis was innovative in using a risk analysis
approach to scientific decisionmaking, rather than following the more
traditional professional judgment approach in which a group of experts
looks at the data and emerges from a smoke-filled room with a set of
conclusions. One USFS ecologist who was central to the SEIS analysis felt
that the risk analysis approach had the potential to change national forest
decisionmaking significantly:
The agency, from district to national forest level to regional
level, has typically operated throughout its history by looking
to a specialist, such as a biologist, for input as to what would
be adequate criteria for providing for a species or a habitat.
This view of things as a risk framework would really turn that
sideways, in the sense that the specialists would provide their
best professional understanding and estimation as to what the
likely outcome on the species and on the habitat would be in
the short term and the long term. And then they would turn
that information over to the line officers, who would weigh

39. Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Supplement to the Final Environmental
Impact Statement For An Amendment to the Pacific Northwest Regional Guide (Aug. 15,
1986) (draft).
40. F. Dale Robertson, Record of Decision: Amendment to the Pacific Northwest Regional
Guide, Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement (Dec. 8, 1988).
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that outcome against similar sorts of assessments on other
interests and issues-the timber, the jobs, and so on-and
come up with a final choice.4'
While this approach would provide decisionmakers with more
information than they might have in the expert judgment model, it was
not necessarily understood or supported by the rest of the agency.
According to another USFS biologist involved in the SEIS analysis: "I
think it took a long time for management to even understand what it was
that we were attempting to do with the viability analysis. There was a lot
of concern expressed by several people about the precedent that the risk
analysis would set for possibly having to subject our other sorts of
analyses to the same sort of scrutiny and laying out in detail not just a
single answer, but the uncertainty surrounding that answer. People said,
Wow, what if we have to do an analysis that showed the uncertainty
surrounding timber yield projections?' That's going to be a completely
different kind of analytical world than the Forest Service is used to
dealing with. " 2
In spite of the unique approach taken to analysis in the SEIS, the
time frame laid down for the analysis was extremely short, with a draft
document including a preferred alternative scheduled to be completed
within six months. While the tight deadlines in part reflected a lack of
appreciation for the complexity of the issue, they mostly indicated the
attitude of the agency towards the need to get the job done and out of
the way of more important business. Next to getting this year's cut out,
the most important thing in the life of much of the USFS leadership was
completing forest planning. Forest plans for Pacific Northwest forests had
been started in 1979 or earlier, but were still incomplete six years later.
The owl issue was seen as a major impediment to getting the plans done.
According to one USFS staff member, "people were desperate to get those
plans out, to finally get something on the street."
Everyone involved in the SEIS analysis felt the pressure coming
from the forest planning effort, with several results on the analysis
process: Some team members thought it important that the analysis
include a multi-party, interagency technical working group who might
collaboratively work on the owl plan considering different ownerships
and management approaches, but the tight time frame limited the

41. Interview with Bruce G. Marcot, Forest Service, US. Dep't of Agriculture, in Portland,
Oregon (July 21,1989).
42. Interview with Richard S. Holthausen, Regional Wildlife Ecologist, Forest Service, U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, in Portland, Oregon (July 19, 1989).
43. Id.
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Interdisciplinary Team's opportunities to build such a group." An
analysis by an organizational management consultant also concluded that
the interest groups were so polarized that a negotiated, consensus-building approach was unlikely to be successful,' and the tight time frame
and agency leaders' underlying lack of comfort with such an approach,
caused them not to try. The tight time frame also limited the scope of the
analysis, forcing analysts to rely on already-existing data, and keep the
focus clearly on owls, even though everyone understood that the
underlying issue was old growth.
By mid-September, the owl SEIS team identified eleven*alternative management schemes, and while they ranged from no formal habitat
protection to protection of all habitat, they were all variations on a
common theme, where habitat areas would be designated in cookie-cutter
fashion spaced equally across the national forest landscape." The team
also identified a series of decision criteria and constructed an approach
to viability analysis that provided estimates of survival probabilities at
various points in the future.
As they moved towards selecting a preferred alternative,
differences of opinion began to emerge about the role of the agency, the
need to be sensitive to political variables in a final allocation, and the
level of risk of long term extinction that was deemed acceptable. The
primary concern of the research biologists and some of the applied
biologists was protecting habitat to insure a viable population of owls.
For some of the managers and the policy-level biologists, long term
political sustainability of an agency decision was most important. They
argued that if the agency went too far on the preservation side, the
political fallout might harm long term owl protection efforts or even have
a backlash effect on the ESA. Others saw the backlash argument as a
shield for continuing business as usual and maintaining a high level of
timber harvest. Regardless of the motive, the indication from the agency's
leaders was that a balanced solution was legally, politically, and
technically appropriate, and that perspective influenced the decisions of
the SEIS team.
The team chose Alternative F as its preferred alternative, an
option in the middle of the range of the alternatives they examined.
Alternative F provided at least 550 spotted owl habitat areas with 1,000
acres to be removed from the land base considered suitable for timber

44. Marcot, supra note 41.
45. Gerald Oncken, Northwest Executive Consultants, Inc., Report to Forest Service
Regarding Interview Findings with Timber Industry and Conservation Groups 5 (Aug. 18,
1985) (on file with author).
46. Spotted Owl SEIS Team, Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Proposed Spotted
Owl SEIS Alternatives 1 (Sept. 11, 1985) (unpublished draft report, on file with author).
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production.' In addition, to protect long term options, timber sales
were not to be scheduled in an additional 1,200 acres per habitat area.
The analysis indicated that the plan would result in a five percent
reduction in timber supplied from the thirteen owl forests in the Pacific
Northwest. It was also seen as resulting in a high probability of owl
survival at the 15-year point, though it tapered down to medium-low
probability at 100 years, low at 150 years, and low-very low at 500 years.
The owl biologists viewed this as inadequate to meeting the legal
requirements for protecting the subspecies. Agency leaders, on the other
hand, were shocked at its implications. To the Chief and his staff,
Alternative F looked like a set-aside of 2,200 acres of owl habitat in 550
locations. According to one team member, "We went back, and of course
the Chief's staff was aghast because here we had doubled the size of the
habitat areas. We were going to completely upset everybody's sales
schedules for the next three years. And rattling
that through forest
48
planning was going to delay forest planning."v
After several months of additional hard work and soul-searching,
the two-volume Draft SEIS (DSEIS) was released for public review in
July, 1986.0 9 Part of what helped the team biologists sign off on it was
that the plan framed an adaptive management approach whereby
direction was ostensibly set for only fifteen years. Research and monitoring carried out during the first fifteen years were to provide more
information so that direction could be changed if necessary.
Members of interest groups and the public were unconvinced.
More than 41,000 comments were received, though sixty percent were
form letters or clipped coupons from interest group literature.' Some
of these letters were sent in response to specific inducements, including
time off from work, Green Stamps, or a paid night on the town provided
by timber companies. The USFS staff diligently computer coded and
summarized the 41,000 responses, noting in their conclusions that "ninety
percent of the letters indicated the people did not read the SEIS, and
were not well informed on the issues."' Of the 41,000 responses, only
344 indicated some support for Alternative F.
A battle for expertise emerged as interest groups began to
provide alternative management plans framed by experts outside the
agencies. The National Wildlife Federation commissioned Russ Lande, a

47. Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, supra note 39.
48. Interview with Thomas Ortman, Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, in Portland,
Oregon (Oct. 5, 1989).
49. Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, supra note 39.
50. Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Public Response Report for the Draft SEIS
1-3 (Jan. 26, 1987) (unpublished draft report, on file with author).
51. Id. at 4.
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biologist at the University of Chicago, to come up with an alternative owl
viability model. Similarly, the National Audubon Society convened a Blue
Ribbon Panel formed under the wing of the American Ornithologists
Union. Both studies concluded that more habitat protection was
warranted to protect the owl, and both were used as mechanisms to
challenge the USFS analysis and claim technical credibility on the issue
in the courts and the Congress.'
As the USFS team moved from the draft to a final SEIS, a number
of changes were made: some were substantive, some were cosmetic and
responded to the widespread confusion on the part of the public in their
reviews of the draft, and some were strategic. Leadership made one
decision criterion, the effects on the Allowable Sale Quantity, extremely
clear: no more than a five percent reduction in the ASQ.' The character of the decisionmaking process also changed, as it increasingly
involved the active participation of top-level agency officials and was
undertaken with less involvement from interests outside the agency.
According to one team member, "All of the work on the analysis leading
up to the final EIS was done in a much more closed-door atmosphere
than the work that had gone on getting ready for the draft. Because the
agency had gotten so much comment on the draft, the majority of it
negative from one camp or the other, it caused the agency to simply kind
of draw in upon itself.I' 4
While individuals from outside the agency were less involved,
top level leaders of the agency were actively involved in the crafting of
the final SEIS, down to the placement of individual habitat areas within
a national forest. One USFS analyst described the intensive involvement
of the Chief, the Regional Forester and their staffs, noting that they
"worked very, very hard to really find that very, very narrow optimal
point in there that would satisfy interests from all sides."
A final SEIS was released to the public in April, 1988.-4 Once
again, the document noted that the decisions described within it were not
really final decisions, since such decisions would be made in the forest
planning process. The preferred alternative seemed to win the battle of
finding something better for both timber and owls, as it reduced harvest

52. Letter from Russell Lande, University of Chicago, to Andy Stahl, Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund (June 12, 1985); William R. Dawson et al., Report of the Advisory Panel on
the Spotted Owl 7 (1986).
53. Holthausen, supra note 42.
54. Id.
55. Marcot, supra note 41.
56. FOREsr SERVICE, US. DEP'T OF AGRICULTuRE, FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE ENVIRONMEN-

TAL IMPAcT STATEMENT FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGIONAL GuIDE
(1988).
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impacts slightly (yielding a five percent drawdown on ASQ) and
increased the probability of survival to moderate levels at the 100 year
point. While the final SEIS seemed to be a better alternative for both
timber and owl interests, in the broader scheme of things and as seen by
the outside world, the changes did not look very dramatic at all, and did
little to quell the mushrooming controversy.
Agency leaders looked forward somewhat uneasily to the reaction
to the final SEIS, though other ongoing events had as much to do with
the nature of the response as the SEIS effort itself. For example, FWS
leadership, who had primary responsibility for implementing the
Endangered Species Act, had avoided getting involved formally in the
controversy, but were dragged into having to take action one way or the
other by petitions from several environmental interest groups. GreenWorld, a little known Massachusetts-based environmental group, petitioned
the FWS to list the spotted owl as an endangered species in November,
1986, and other environmental groups joined in. 7 While a number of
internal and outside experts considered the owl's situation as warranting
listing, FWS leadership declined to list the owl.' Instead, the FWS,
USFS, BLM and the National Park Service signed an interagency
agreement pledging cooperation that they claimed would protect and
perpetuate the spotted owl.But the approach the federal agencies had taken began to fall
apart in 1988. In January, the Washington Wildlife Commission declared
the northern spotted owl a state-listed endangered species and directed
the Washington Department of Wildlife to prepare a recovery plan for the
subspecies. As a result, the state agency became much more active in
opposing federal management direction, including opposing USFS timber
sales in court.' In addition, the Spotted Owl Subcommittee of the
Oregon-Washington Interagency Wildlife Committee updated their 1981
plan and produced draft guidelines that called for much more extensive
protection than that contemplated by the USFS.61 Also in early 1988, the
National Audubon Society indicated their intent to seek endangered

57. Letter from Max Strahan, GreenWorld, to Frank Dunkle, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Nov. 28, 1986), reprinted in U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED
SPECIES: SPOTTED OWL PEITrIoN BESET BY PROBLEMS, at 19 (1989); Interview with Andy Stahl,
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, in Seattle, Washington (July 24, 1989).
58. 52 Fed. Reg. 48,552 (Dec. 23, 1987).
59. 52 Fed. Reg. 48,553-54 (Dec. 23, 1987).
60. Interview with Harriet Allen, Washington Department of Wildlife, in Olympia,
Washington (July 27, 1989).
61. Spotted Owl Subcommittee, Oregon-Washington Interagency Wildlife Committee,
Draft Interagency Management Guidelines for the Northern Spotted Owl in Washington,
Oregon, and California (Mar. 28, 1988) (unpublished draft report, on file with author).
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status for the marbled murrelet, an old growth-nesting seabird,' 2 and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals prohibited the BLM from selling
old-growth trees.' Perhaps most impacting on the ultimate course of
events was a court decision that came down in November, 1988, that
called the FWS' decision on the spotted owl petition "arbitrary and
capricious" and asked agency leaders to explain their decision." No one
was surprised when the agency indicated in December that new
information had come to light, and it would reopen the status review.'
The USFS Chief signed a record of decision for the Final SEIS on
December 8, 1988.6 By that time, it was pretty clear that there was not
much else to do, although agency leaders still tried to find that narrow
point of balance between the different interests. The final decision on the
SEIS was not viewed favorably by many of the internal agency experts.
While they understood that the decision was not intended to be based
purely on biology, they still were uncomfortable with the final choice.
The fact that few of the agency biologists supported the Chief's choice
was a major concern within the agency, particularly after what had
happened to the FWS regarding its listing decision.
If the internal experts were unhappy about the Chief's decision,
outside groups were more so, and in the next two months, both
environmental and timber groups filed lawsuits challenging the SEIS and
the Chief's decision. Injunctions were granted that stopped the USFS from
carrying out some 139 planned timber sales.' Loggers staged protests
in the Pacific Northwest and in Washington, D.C., and anger and anxiety
boiled in the cauldrons of public opinion.
In the events that followed, the USFS lost most of its control over
the direction of the issue. Its expertise and information were challenged,
the credibility of its leadership was weakened, and Congress and others
began talking about fundamental changes in the direction and mission of
the agency. Perhaps nothing affected the future direction of the issue
more than the FWS' decision to list the spotted owl as a threatened
species under the ESA." It is sometimes hard to remember that the owl

62. Interview with Jim Pissot, National Audubon Society, in Washington, D.C. (May 5,
1989). The marbled murrelet was subsequently listed by the FWS as a threatened species in
September, 1992. Sea Bird is Listed as Threatened, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, § I at 5.
63. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1989).
64. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
65. The FWS created a new status review team on December 5, 1988, which, after
reviewing the record, concluded that "there was considerable new information available .... 54 Fed. Reg. 26,670 (June23, 1989). On January 27, 1989, the Service indicated
that it was formally reopening the status review. 54 Fed. Reg. 4049 (Jan. 27, 1989).
66. Robertson, supra note 40.
67. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
68. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,666 (1989).
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was not a listed species through the preceding controversy, and the
proposal by the FWS in June, 1989, to list the owl-and its final listing a
year later-raised the stakes for everyone.
Congress, the USFS, the Bush Administration and environmental
groups all responded to the threats and opportunities posed by the owl
listing. While the patrons of the environmental groups in Congress
pushed ancient forest protection bills, the patrons of timber pushed in the
opposite direction. The most either could achieve was a temporary
compromise that for the first time recognized the value of old growth in
federal law, but that also mandated significant timber harvest levels for
two fiscal years.'
For its part, the USFS tried to seek the moral high ground of
technical legitimacy, convening an Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC)
led by one of the agency's most credible scientists, Jack Ward Thomas.
The ISC involved representatives of the USFS, FWS and the BLM, and its
report (made public in April, 1990) called for protection of some 8.4
million acres of forestland in large blocks called Habitat Conservation
Areas.' In response, the USFS announced that it would manage its
lands in a manner "not inconsistent with" the ISC recommendations.'
The environmental groups continued to press their advantage in
the courts, attacking both the USFS and the FWS. The groups challenged
the USFS's decision to use the ISC report as a basic for management
without following proper administrative procedures, and the federal
court agreed with them.' The groups also challenged the FWS decision
not to list critical habitat when it listed the owl, and again, the court
agreed with them.' Both agencies were sent back to redo their administrative decisionmaking processes, with much of the USFS timber sale
program in the Northwest suspended pending completion of a new
management plan.
The Bush Administration did not like the direction things were
going and repeatedly sought to find a more "balanced" solution, but was
unable to do so. In the final year of the Administration, the BLM sought
and initially received an exemption from the provisions of the ESA for a
small number of timber sales granted by the so-called God Squad. The
exemption decision was also challenged by environmental groups, and
it too was overruled by court and subsequent administrative action.'
69. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 264, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
70. JACK W. THOMAS ET AL, A CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE NoRTHERN SPOTED
OWL (1990).
71. 55 Fed. Reg. 40,413 (1990).

72. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991), affd, 952 F.
2nd. 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
73. Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
74. In the spotted owl case, five of seven committee members voted to grant an
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The owl became a visible campaign issue in the 1992 presidential
election, with President Bush decrying the "spotted owl people," and
then-candidate Bill Clinton pledging to find an effective compromise
through a collaborative process.' After holding a nationally-televised
Forest Conference in Portland Oregon in April, 1993, and convening a
Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT)76 to frame
possible decisions, President Clinton bought into a package of old growth
reserves, management areas and economic assistance to groups in the
Pacific Northwest that would result in dramatically smaller timber
harvests than in the preceding two decades. Both environmental and
timber groups challenged his decision, called Option 9, though its overall
direction was assured through the appointment of Jack Ward Thomas as
USFS Chief and Bruce Babbitt as Interior Secretary. More than 20 years
after the spotted owl was recognized as a federal land management issue,
a final solution is not fully in place, though countless hours of individual,
interest group, agency, court, and congressional time have been spent on
the issue.
Evaluating the HistoricalExperience
Under any circumstances, the spotted owl controversy would
have been difficult to resolve. The owl issue was simply the tip of the
iceberg; beneath its surface lay a multiplicity of issues, including old
growth management, wilderness preservation, the future character of the
political and economic landscape of the Pacific Northwest, and the future
of the USFS and the BLM, among others." An extensive set of individu-

exemption, after at least one of the members was directed to do so by high level political
executives. See YAFFEE, supra note 1, at 139, 246. The decision to grant the exemption was
challenged, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals directed an Administrative Law Judge
to conduct an inquiry into whether President Bush and his staff had engaged in improper
ex parte communications with the committee. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. The Endangered
Species Committee, 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993). Following the change in Administration,
the BLM withdrew its application for an exemption, making the court inquiry moot. Telephone interview with Todd True, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, (Sept. 21,1994). See also
Henry Weinstein, Spotted Owl Wins Another Round in Court, L.A. T"IMES, Feb. 11, 1993, at A3.
75. Jeff Mapes, Clinton Vows NW Forest Summit; Bush Eyes Changes in Species Act,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 27, 1992.

76. FEMAT was directed to take an ecosystem approach to forest management planning,
considering the needs of numerous species dependent on the old-growth Douglas fir forests
of the Pacific Northwest, and both ecological and socioeconomic factors. The team's analysis
considered ten alternative management schemes, and was published in July, 1993. See
FOREST ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM, FOREST ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT; AN
ECOLICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL AssESSMENT (1993).

77. With passage of wilderness bills for Oregon and Washington in the early 1980s,
wilderness advocates looked for a new lever to protect undesignated lands, and endangered

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

als, interest groups and agencies were affected by these issues, and
mobilized to pursue their interests through various administrative, legal
and political channels, and their stakes in the outcome of the issue were
extraordinarily high. In addition, considerable uncertainty was evident in
the issue, including a lack of knowledge about biology, economics, and
the role of government.7 The policy choices themselves pitted short
term, tangible concerns against long term, intangible goals, and often
involved battles over fundamental values, characteristics of controversies
that make them resistant to effective resolution. By the end of the
controversy, the choices appeared to be zero sum" -- either owls or
economic interests would win-and few options seemingly were left to
satisfy all parties.
While the owl issue was intrinsically difficult to resolve, agency
leaders also failed to foster opportunities for resolution or to move their
agencies into a proactive stance such that future choices are likely to
appear much different. Formal agency leaders-individuals whose
authority is established by law or organizational structure-always have
a dual role as guardians of established values and modes of action, and
vanguards of new ideas and opportunities. s Clearly there is wisdom in
the past. Traditional ways of doing things have been tested by the
realities of time, agency staff are accomplished at carrying out their tasks,
and longstanding patterns of individual and organizational behavior
create a predictable and energy-conserving reality for agency staffers and
leaders alike. The fact that traditional objectives and methods exist in
their current forms also reflect political and legal constraints. That is,
organizations generally do what they do because they are administratively comfortable, politically and fiscally feasible, and legally allowable. Like
all organisms, they define, find, and protect a decision space-a niche-in
which they are comfortable and can thrive.

species protection was an effective choice. Andy Stahl, Old-Growth's Last Stand?, Comments
at the Sixth Annual Western Public Interest Law Conference, University of Oregon School
of Law (Mar. 5, 1988). See also DENNIS M. RoTH, THE WILDERNESS MOVEMENT AND THE
NATIONAL FORESTS (1988).
78. These areas of uncertainty are described in YAFME, supra note 1, at 170-77.
79. A zero sum situation is one in which one group can increase their benefits only at the
cost of those of another group: what one wins another loses. Dividing up a pie between
individuals represents a zero sum situation where all the server can do is to split what is
on the table between those who will consume the pie. A zero sum, win-lose situation is
contrasted with a win-win situation where the size of what is on the table can be expanded,
or the pie can be split in a new way in which all parties have their needs satisfied.
80. There is extensive literature on leadership that discusses a variety of leadership roles.
See, e.g., WARREN G. BENNIS, ON BECOMING A LEADER (1989); ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP
DEVELOPING EFFECIVE SuLLS AND STYLES (Joyce K. Berry & John C. Gordon eds., 1993).

Spring 19951

LESSONS ABOUT LEADERSHIP

Rarely do conditions inside and outside an agency stay static, and
in a dynamic environment, agency leaders must become agents of change
within their organizations, otherwise their agencies become increasingly
irrelevant and less competitive in a changing world. Even public sector
bureaucracies compete for survival, though failure takes longer to catch
up with them. Agency leaders must foster and reward the good ideas of
their staffs, look for opportunities to promote innovation in their
organizations, monitor the political environment in which they function
and respond to needs and opportunities, and simultaneously build an
external environment supportive of desired agency direction. For agencies
in the natural resources and environmental realm, agency leaders must
encourage their staffs to monitor, develop, and use science and techniques close to the forefront of knowledge, so that their fundamental
source of legitimacy-as repositories of wisdom gained through technical
means-is not questioned.
There is a tension between the objectives of seeking change while
maintaining the stability of the past that manifests itself at both the
individual and organization levels. For an individual, life is constantly a
battle between resistance and adaptation to change since change requires
expending energy and taking risks, though the individual's search for
meaning in life often promotes change. Organizations express these same
dynamics, but because organizational management is fundamentally
about influencing the relationships between multiple individuals and
units, change becomes more difficult. Organizational control and
predictability tend to become dominant objectives,"1 with leaders fearing
the chaos that comes from visible controversy more than anything else.
The result is that they tend to retrench into the objective of holding onto
the past, resist change, and maintain short term control of their organizations at all costs.
In the spotted owl case, formal USFS leaders tended to be
ambivalent or hostile to the changes implied by owl or old-growth
preservation, and as the case progressed, they became increasingly
resistant to significant change. While they were under significant political
pressures from development interests as expressed by a development-oriented Administration, agency leaders did little to build a politically
feasible decision space that accurately reflected emerging public values
and scientific understanding. In addition, agency leaders were seen as
behind the times in adapting the fundamental tenets of the USFS's
mission-a set of principles that had served the agency well over the
years-to the evolving realities of the times. Technically-based, multiple

81. See, e.g., GEORGE C. EDWARDS, m, IMPLEMENTING PUBUC POLCY (1980); FRANCIS E.
ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLmCS AND PUBLIC POUiCY (3d ed. 1984).
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use management that simultaneously sought to serve people and protect
the resource base was still an appropriate mission, but its implementation
was flawed and its interpretation out-of-date. In the Pacific Northwest at
least, timber production became the dominant use, evidence was coming
to the fore that the resource base was inadequately protected, and the
technical means of making choices increasingly were behind the times. By
the end of the controversy, agency leaders were seen as neither true to
their science base nor supportive of agency staff, and became
delegitimized in the eyes of agency staffers and external decisionmakers,
including many members of Congress.'
At several points in time, agency leaders also missed opportunities to deal effectively with the burgeoning conflict, including an
opportunity to embrace a minimally technically credible owl management
plan in the Regional Guide, at a time when the interest groups were less
polarized and mobilized, and the recession provided some slack in the
old-growth timber base. The SEIS was also a time when an interagency
group of scientists could have been assembled to devise a technically
credible solution, such as the one described by the Audubon Blue Ribbon
Panel that, had agency leaders embraced it and offered other benefits to
timber-dependent communities, perhaps the runaway controversy could
have been handled in a more effective and controlled manner. Through
much of the agency's response to the issue, agency leaders generally were
not avoiding it completely. Rather, they placed it within standard
operating procedures that were inappropriate or dysfunctional for
resolving the underlying issues in controversy.
While there are various reasons and motives for these responses,
some benign and some malignant, the net effect is the same. Formal
agency leaders did not respond to the issue in a form or magnitude
concomitant with need, lost credibility with their staffs and outside
decisionmakers, and ceded the role of organizational change agent to
others inside and outside the agency. Those who took a leadership role
in the agency did so more in spite of the direction set by formal agency
leaders. Leaders emerged within the wildlife and fisheries staff, research

82. For example, in the Congressional hearings on old-growth management in the
summer of 1989, the USFS officially pegged national forest old-growth at 6.2 million acres,
while The Wilderness Society (TWS), based on an extensive mapping exercise, had
concluded that the correct figure was less than 2.4 million acres. Much of the USFS staff felt
that TWS's data was better than their own, and advised the Chief not to debate the numbers
in the hearing. But he changed his prepared testimony on the way to the hearing to challenge TWS's analysis. Most of the Congressional participants had been briefed on the different data before the hearing. By challenging TWS's data, the Chief appeared to be an
advocate of the agency position and not a dispassionate technical expert. In doing so, he
tended to delegitimize his position. See YAFFEE, supra note 1, at 205-06.
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units, at lower levels of the line, and outside the agency in interest
groups and the Congress.
Part of the reason that the organizational response to the spotted
owl issue was inadequate was because the issue developed within a
period of significant change, requiring a more elaborate and complex
response than at any time in the previous history of the agency. The
1970s and 1980s were a time of significant change in public values,
political organization, agency demographics, and the science base
underlying land management, and the owl controversy in part reflected
inevitable adjustments to these kinds of change. Formal USFS direction
did change, but not enough to respond to the changes in the agency's
external environment, let alone to serve as a beacon, guiding those
interested in public forest management to an appropriate and effective
future.
There is no doubt that the overall values of the American public
changed through the two decades. The ending of the Vietnam War, the
Watergate incident, and subsequent events created a shifting set of public
attitudes that were increasingly mistrustful of formal government
institutions such as the USFS. The rise of environmentalism as a popular
movement and the coming of age of the baby boomers legitimized a
broad set of values in national forests, including nongame wildlife
preservation. An increasingly urban population valued traditional
recreational uses of forest lands such as hunting less and, divorced from
the means of production of the commodities that it sought with a
vengeance, was more willing to make claims on public resources even if
these claims conflicted with commodity production. By the end of the
period, these trends in public values generated remarkably broad support
for environmental objectives,' and the apparent affluence of the 1980s
promoted environmental causes even while the national political
leadership did all they could to oppose them. Clearly, the signals that the
Executive Office sent to agencies like the USFS were in conflict with
emerging public values in natural resources, and help to explain the

83. For example, a 1991 Gallup poll reported that 71% of those surveyed agreed that
environmental protection should be given priority even at the risk of curbing economic
growth, while only 1 in 5 felt the converse. More than half (57%) favored taking "immediate
drastic action" toward environmental protection, while only 8% felt we should "continue as
now." Seventy-eight percent considered themselves to be environmentalists. Graham Hueber, Americans Report High Levels of Envirownental Concern, Activity, THE GALLUP POLL
MONTHLY, No. 307, Apr. 1991, at 6-8. A national poll conducted in December, 1991, found
that two-thirds of voters across the country supported the Endangered Species Act, and 40%
supported it strongly. Memorandum from Greenberg/Lake, The Analysis Group and the
Tarrance Group, to The Nature Conservancy and The National Audubon Society (jan. 8,
1992) (regarding Bipartisan Poll Results) (on file with author).
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response of the agency to controversies like the owl case. However, not
all blame can be laid on the doorstep of the White House.
American political organization changed dramatically in the 1970s
and 1980s, with the decline of political parties and the rise of interest
group politics," and environmental groups matured and became more
effective players on the national political stage.' Their effectiveness
resulted partly from the shift in grassroots values and partly because of
an increased set of opportunities to make their case. Policy levers such as
the ESA, NEPA, and the NFMA-induced planning process provided
access, information, and defined the groundrules for decisionmaking in
ways that leveled the playing field significantly. Interest groups not only
had access, but a set of rules that lifted the decisions of agencies at least
partly out of the smoke-filled backrooms of Washington, D.C. Groups like
The Wilderness Society invested in parallel expertise such that their
information base and arguments were seen as equally credible as those
of the USFS.
The USFS itself was not immune to these changes in values and
perspectives, and its changing demographics added a measure of
organizational turbulence that was unprecedented. As the set of leaders
who were value-programmed in World War II rose to the top of the
agency and began to retire, younger staff members brought to the agency
a representative set of the broader set of public values evolving around
the agency. The new legislative mandates required hiring individuals
trained in nontraditional ways, including nongame wildlife biology,
recreation, public involvement, and planning, and these individuals came
complete with different ideas about the balance between resource
development and protection, and the legitimacy of top-down administrative control. Mandates to expand the racial and gender mix of the agency
furthered this process of value shifts within the agency. All of these
changes resulted in a workforce that was at times less supportive of
formal agency leaders' objectives or administrative management methods.
In many ways, changes in the science base underlying forest
resource management empowered those who differed with agency
direction, and enabled them to challenge agency choices. The evolving
science of conservation biology and landscape ecology' generated new

84. See JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY (2d ed. 1989).
85. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITIcs IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985 (1987); PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE:
THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993).
86. See, e.g., CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY-EcOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

(Michael E. Sould & Bruce A. Wilcox eds., 1980); REED F. NOSs & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER,
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, SAVING NATURE'S LEGACY: PROTECTING AND RESTORING BIODIVERsrrY (1994).
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ideas about the breadth of values in forest systems, implied shifts in land
management practice, and gave nontraditional experts a means for
influencing management choices. It is the duty of agency leaders to
organize their units such that information is brought to bear on problems
in a way that provides both direction and legitimacy for agency choices,
and USFS leaders failed at fulfilling this role adequately. Over time,
agency leadership tried to finesse the disparity between the judgments of
their own scientists and what they viewed as politically feasible, and
were seen increasingly as acting in ways that were not true to their
science base. Since the primary source of credibility for the USFS is its
claim to expertise, a perception of leadership-endorsed politicization of
science tended to delegitimize the agency and reduce its effect on
decisionmaking.
While all of these changes were occurring in the societal
environment in which the USFS functioned, the agency itself was not well
organized to promote significant change in direction or methods. While
the agency is in many ways decentralized, with leadership authority
shared amongst line officers dispersed across the country, strong norms
of behavior generated remarkably strong top-down control, reinforced by
an almost militaristic sense of the individual's responsibility to the
organization." Norms that generate top-down control also resist the
flow of contrary information upward, and leave leaders ignorant of
changes that are needed to be instituted in their organizations.
In addition, the USFS's organizational self-image as the technical
experts in forest management tended to minimize how much they heard
critics outside theagency. It was not that they were not listening. Indeed,
agency leaders instituted highly elaborate public involvement processes
in much the same way they created elaborate management schemes: as
a technical means to solve the public participation problem. But in the
multiple listening sessions, computer coding of public comments, and the
retreat to agency offices to come up with the solutions to the problems
agency officials thought they heard, meaning was lost and outside critics,
whose expectations had been raised by their involvement, were frustrated
by little substantial change in agency direction.
Toward the end of the owl dispute, agency leaders defined a new
self-image: that of a neutral balance point between a diverse set of clients,
where success is having everyone equally angry at you. Unfortunately,
that image also diminished their effectiveness, for it got them further
from their technical base as a source of legitimacy and guaranteed that
their decisions would never endure. Defining success as a situation that

87. HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR

(1960); YAFFEE, supra note 1, at 256-75.
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is equitable in generating shared anger is a perverse strategy guaranteed
to promote longstanding conflict.
As the agency's external environment continued to evolve
without an adequate response from agency leaders, their ability to lead
was diminished. No doubt they felt that there was no right answer to the
situation facing them, and by the end of the conflict, that was probably
true. But at times, agency leaders tended to look like deer caught in the
headlights of an oncoming automobile, frozen in time. While no one truly
knows what is going on in their minds at that time, there must be a sense
of hopelessness and impending doom, and a sadness about unrealized
promise.
Lessons for the Futures
The pattern of behavior evident in the evolution of the spotted
owl case is not predetermined, such that future crises are inevitable. As
new agency leaders seek to reinvent their organizations for the challenges
of the next century of conservation, there are ways for them to move their
organizations into more effective, credible and proactive stances. Indeed,
while it causes short term organizational problems, change in the external
environment also creates opportunities and the chance to try out new
behaviors that are precluded in more stable times. If there is one thing
certain about the future, it is that change will occur. Hence, rather than
viewing change as an enemy, leaders should see it as a source of
opportunities and excitement that can mobilize creativity and a sense of
esprit de corps.
To do this, leaders must create organizations that constantly seek
new ideas about resource and organizational management, scan for
changes in values and preferences in the external environment, and
continually build a data base of information that informs necessary
choices as they arise. The Forest Service's legitimacy rests on the quality
of its information and its ability to process that information in a way that
is useful to society. If its information is of poor quality or is inadequate
to inform policy choices, or if agency leaders are not honest about the
information that they have, as is suggested at times by the spotted owl
case, we are better off relying on other groups or approaches to assist us
in making collective choices.
Agency leaders need to invest in ongoing monitoring and
resource inventory in ways that have not been employed in the past.
They need an active scientific research program, linked to other sources

88. An extended discussion of lessons from the spotted owl case is contained in YAFFEE,
supra note 1, at 329-77.
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of new ideas including academe and other agencies, to ensure that the
USFS is at the forefront of resource management knowledge and
techniques. Leaders equally need to improve the ways that information
flows within the agency, so that a greater sharing of information occurs
and accurate information moves upward so that leaders understand the
conditions at the field level. The top-down, quasi-militaristic culture of
the agency in the past 50 years has fostered a good soldier mentality that
tends to surface information that is supportive of leadership, rather than
information that may indicate problems at the ground and in agency
direction. This "shoot the messenger" phenomenon must change, because
disconfirming information is what leaders need most, and they should
seek it aggressively in part by increasing their own involvement at the
field level. As the going gets tough in organizations, the tendency is for
leaders to circle the wagons and isolate themselves. Good leaders find
ways to offset this tendency.
The USFS leadership also needs to do more in the way of
value-scanning than it has done in the past 25 years, checking agency
direction against changes in current and likely future public values. The
owl case suggests a leadership structure that increasingly became
insensitive to changes in the sets of values that were developing in the
aggregate public. Since one source of USFS legitimacy rests on its ability
to pursue objectives that the populace desires, it must develop a robust
understanding of what those objectives and values are, and work to
adapt their organization to them, in spite of the tendency for bureaucracies to form strong norms of accepted behavior and hold to them at all
costs. At the same time, the latter-day image of the USFS as a business
with the variety of societal interests and groups as its clients is seriously
deficient, for it implies a reactive, demand-satisfying role on the part of
the agency. In fact, the USFS leadership should view good science and
the needs and interests of future generations as a set of additional
concerns that they must represent into a policy process that is inherently
status quo-oriented.
The spotted owl case clearly suggests that currently there is no
obvious agreement on desired direction for national forest management,
and the persistence of the controversy indicates a situation whereby the
power to decide is highly fragmented across the multiple sets of interests.
To respond to this situation, agency leaders must work to build political
concurrence in ways that they have not had to do before. At the upper
levels of the agency, this means that they must work the political
landscape in more extensive and creative ways. The diversity of interests
in forest management decisions is real, and creates an exciting set of
possibilities because fragmented power allows the formation of new
coalitions, and there is the opportunity today for agency leaders to build
a new broad-based political coalition for national forest management.
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Coalition-formation will both enable the agency to take action
and will bind them to the interests of the coalition. The best way to guard
against being bound tightly, or bound to a set of interests wedded to the
past, is to keep the power dynamics within the range of interests in flux.
The opportunity that exists today is to forge crosscutting, dynamic
alliances across the range of interests, not to bind the agency to a specific
set of externally-given directions that will become obsolete over time.
Hence the agency should always keep looking ahead to involve new
interests as they emerge.
Other ways exist to build political concurrence. At the ground
level, agency leaders need to modify what is still a top-down model of
decision-making, and try to employ some of the approaches currently
entitled alternative dispute resolution approaches. Building interagency
networks of scientists, managers and policymakers is another way to
build political concurrence, while enhancing agency effectiveness. Other
ways to make the agency boundaries more permeable, including
interchanges of staff with other public and private organizations, as well
as an active outreach and public education program, will help to build
the political support around an appropriate and effective set of forest
management objectives, and hopefully rebuild trust in the agency that is
sorely lacking today.
Agency leaders also need to find new ways to mobilize their staff
and make them proud and excited about agency directions. This means
creating an organizational environment that promotes and rewards
creativity and risk-taking. Since individuals are more likely to try out
new. behaviors and take risks when they have some slack resources,
agency leaders need to find ways to create slack in the organization, so
that individual staff members and organizational subunits are not so
stressed that they cannot try anything innovative. Creativity and
risk-taking are also more likely in an organization that does not penalize
well-intended failures. The national forests provide a remarkable set of
opportunities for experimenting with different approaches to science,
management, and decisionmaking, and agency leaders should utilize this
resource by promoting a culture of small-scale experimentation, evaluation, and communication of success and failure.
Leadership also must seek to change some of the longstanding
but increasingly counterproductive norms of behavior that have
contributed to the current situation, as illustrated by the spotted owl case.
Changes need to be instituted to ameliorate both the tendency for timber
89. See, e.g., GAIL BINCHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF
EXPERIENCE (1986); LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND& JEFFREY L. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987); JULIA M. WONDOLLECK,
PUBLIC LANDS CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION: MANAGING NATIONAL FOREST DISPUTES (1988).
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production objectives to dominate other agency objectives and the
inclination of agency leaders to view nontimber objectives as adjuncts of
the timber program. While admirable in some ways, the "can do"
mentality of the agency needs to be tempered, so that direction is
pursued that is scientifically legitimate and responsive to a broad set of
public interests. The image of the agency as a tight family needs to be
expanded so that the agency and its staff are viewed as a part of an
extended family of resource professionals and interested parties.'* The
leadership structure and staff itself also need to be updated for the times,
so that the diversity of values and skills that are prevalent in our society
are well represented and supported in the agency.
It is the case that leadership is a shared function within an
organization, and leaders can emerge and promote new ideas and new
directions from all levels of an organization. At the same time, the formal
leadership of an organization is critically important to its internal
functioning and how well it is understood and supported externally.
Agency leaders must model good behavior if they expect it of their staff.
The most hardworking and creative organizations are those whose
leaders are equally and visibly hardworking and creative. Whether they
want it to or not, their behavior becomes a role model for aspiring
leaders in their organizations, and that makes it doubly important: Not
only do their actions have an impact on today's issues and choices, but
they have a longer term effect on the styles of management carried out
throughout their organizations.
Agency leaders are often the most visible representatives of the
agency to the external world, and the image they create is associated in
the viewing public's mind as the agency. They represent the public
persona of their agency, and hence their role as "image of the organization" becomes very important. If they are charismatic and obviously
knowledgeable, the organization is viewed similarly. If they are seen as
dull and uninformed, the agency loses some of its luster. Just like old
trees are important components of the old-growth ecosystem contributing
nutrients and other qualities long after they stand upright in the forest
system, old organizational leaders are important influences on the
direction, image, and relevance of their organizations. The mechanisms
that reward and promote individuals in the USFS must find and elevate
the best and the brightest to formal leadership roles.
For much of its existence, the U.S. Forest Service as an organization has been perceived as a leader in resource and organizational

90. Steven L. Yaffee & Julia M. Wondolleck, Building Bridges Across Agency Boundaries, in
FORESTRY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE SCIENCE OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (Jerry

F. Franklin & Kathryn A. Kohm eds., forthcoming 1995).
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management-a shining star in the constellation of federal agencies.
Through the evolution of the spotted owl case and associated controversies of the 1980s and early 1990s, the agency has lost much of its standing
with the American public, their elected representatives, and the scientific
community. It is not too late. Most observers from all sides of the owl
issue want the agency to succeed, for they understand the significance of
failure. For politicians who do not want to have to make hard choices,
durable, legitimate agency decisions are vastly preferred. Most interest
groups understand that if the Forest Service cannot succeed, then there
is no hope at all for less gifted agencies, like the Bureau of Land
Management and the Fish and Wildlife Service.
The Forest Service and its new leaders have the opportunity to
once again be seen as effective, credible, and innovative sources of
important ideas and decisions in American society. By rebuilding an
organization and a political environment that promotes multiple-value,
science-based, consensus-building forest management decisions, agency
leaders can regain the trust and legitimacy that was associated with the
Forest Service for the first 50 years of its history. To do otherwise is to
doom all of us to an endless repeat of the drama and tragedy of the
spotted owl issue.

